

Further...


- Price-walking is banned
- Applies also to closed books (what is now the most equivalent product)
- Senior Managers to personally attest (and report to the FCA) annually that pricing models comply
- Records of pricing considerations to be kept
- Existing customers to benefit just as much as new customers from any discounts





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|--|----|
| ercentage chance to win back the premium nts in a retail loyalty scheme | N |
| ts in a retail loyalty scheme | N |
| | |
| etail vouchers | Ye |
| | Ye |
| ashback | Ye |
| free add-on | Ye |
| ne month free | Ye |
| monetary discount on the premium | Ye |
| percentage discount on the premium | Ye |

A firm must notify the FCA if it becomes aware that any other firm in the distribution chain is not any other firm in the distribution chain is not also be a straight of the distraight of the distribution chain is not


- that any other firm in the distribution chain is not or may not be complying with the rules in this chapter (ICOBS 6B2.45R)
- Existing renewal disclosures apply and a firm should not discourage customers from shopping around and records need to be kept to evidence this
- Renewal fees/charges cannot be higher (and what are these actually for?)

































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|-------|-----|--|---|--|
| 1.4.7 | R | <i>PROD</i> 4 applies to a <i>firm</i> with respect to activities carried on from an establishment maintained by it, or its <i>appointed representative;</i> : | | |
| | | <u>(1)</u> | (for all insurance products and <i>pathway investments</i>) in the United Kingdom; and | |
| | | <u>(2)</u> | (in addition, for <i>non-investment insurance products</i>) overseas, in relation to an insurance product that is, or will be, marketed or <i>distributed</i> , or there are policies under the product that remain in force, in the <i>United Kingdom</i> . | |
| | | [Note | e: $\underline{\text{in respect of (1)}}$. article 7(2) of the <i>IDD</i>] | |












Further...


- Firms to review all products at least every 12 months (starting 1 October 2021 and more frequently if a product has a higher risk of generating harm)
- Value assessment to be undertaken to include distribution strategy and how this influences value (incl remuneration awareness for the chain) and distributors to have an involvement in this
- Amend distribution process if this results in harm
- Remind that assessment of D&N is continual







| <u>4.2.140</u> <u>6</u> | G (1) Where the <i>firm</i> is considering the effects of the distribution arrangements on value it should consider whether the additional costs of any individual party in the arrangements that add to the total price paid by the <i>customer</i> deliver any, or a proportional, additional benefit. If not, <i>firms</i> should consider how they can be satisfied that the arrangements are consistent with their obligations to be able to clearly demonstrate fair value to the <i>customer</i>. | |
|---|--|--|
| <u>4.2.14P</u> <u>R</u> | <u>A firm must obtain from any person in the distribution arrangements all</u> necessary and relevant information to enable it to identify the remuneration | |
| associated with the distribution arrangements to allow it to assess the ongoing value of the product, including at least: | | |
| (1) | the type and amount of remuneration of each person in the distribution arrangement where this is part of the <i>premium</i> or otherwise paid directly by the <i>customer</i> , including in relation to <i>additional products</i> (other than where this relates to another <i>non-investment insurance product</i> for which the <i>firm</i> is not a <i>manufacturer</i>): | |
| <u>(2)</u> | an explanation of the services provided by each person in the distribution arrangements; and | |
| (3) | confirmation from any <i>firm</i> in the distribution arrangements that any remuneration is consistent with their regulatory obligations including <i>SYSC</i> 19F.2 (IDD remuneration incentives). | |










In a nutshell

- · Joint obligation insurer and broker
- Agree what roles each party has in the manufacturing and/or distribution process
- Understand if what you do adds or detracts from the value of the product
- · Is there anyone else in the chain and if so
 - what do they do?
 - how much do they get paid for it?
 - is this fair?
 - how does any of this add value to the end customer?
- Brokers to incl net rated and what fees/charges are for - what <u>extra</u> value do these provide?



Multi-occupancy

- Increasing costs being passed to leaseholders and tenants (people at the end of all of this despite the policyholder being a commercial customer)
- FCA expect adequate resources incl knowledge and expertise to provide an appropriate service
- Intermediaries (and anyone else involved in the distribution) should not adversely affect the value of the product/are insurer commissions excessive?
- Does the commission you receive (and the PMA) bear a reasonable relationship to the benefits/services provided and the costs incurred? Higher premiums mean more commission but what <u>extra</u> is being provided?
- Refusal to disclose commissions



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
Upper tribunal rejects second attempt at dumping £355,000 Virgin Active gym debt onto the leaseholders' service charges at prime London Docklands site


Christodoulou's Yianis Group also criticised for corporate restructuring to nobble section 24 court appointed management

★ Christodoulou's insurance broker Reich, which is Financial Conduct Authority regulated, ordered to disclose spreadsheet showing any commissions baked into premiums following Communities Secretary Michael Gove ordering joint FCA / Competition and Markets Authority probe into spiraling leasehold insurance costs

Judge Martin Rodger QC dismayed by the billionaire freeholder's 'extremely unattractive' approach to tribunal




















Some options?

- 1. Pooling arrangement to increase competition
- 2. Greater transparency and better disclosure
- 3. Hard disclosure of commissions to all
- 4. Address remuneration practices and commissions
- 5. Insurers working with FCA on better risk data



